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Abstract— The Internet is now heavily relied upon by the critical 
infrastructures (CI). This has led to different security threats facing 
interconnected security systems. By understanding the complexity of 
critical infrastructure interdependency, and how to take advantage of 
it in order to minimize the cascading problem, enables the prediction 
of potential problems before they happen. Our proposed system, 
detailed in this paper, is able to detect cyber-attacks and share the 
knowledge with interconnected partners to create an immune system 
network. In order to demonstrate our approach, a realistic simulation 
is used to construct data and evaluate the system put forward. This 
paper provides a summary of the work to-date, on the development 
of a system titled Critical Infrastructure Auto-Immune Response 
System (CIAIRS). It provides a view of the main CIAIRS segments 
which comprise the framework and illustrates the functioning of the 
system. 
Keywords; — Critical Infrastructure, Distributed System, System 
of Systems, Data Analysis, Cyber-attack. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The role of one infrastructure influences the functioning of 
others. This can be referred to as interdependency. 
Interdependency is considered the main challenges for critical 
infrastructures (CI). Operating as a mutually interdependent 
network, treated as a system of systems, failures and 
successful cyber-attacks have the potential to cause a 
cascading effect. Understanding the interconnectivity 
behaviour between the critical infrastructures, and how it 
changes depending on the complexity, can reduce the effect 
before cascading occurs. Moreover, this would control the 
damage and limit the impact [1].  
The risk of cascading failure among distributed systems is 
the main influential factor behind this research. To date, our 
previous work has involved creating a support system against 
cyber-attacks, using the human immune system mechanism as 
inspiration for the design [2]. The system is titled Critical 
Infrastructure Auto-Immune Response System (CIAIRS); in 
this paper, the framework for CIAIRS is presented. The 
operation process and design for CIAIRS is discussed, along 
with the evaluation of CIAIRS using a simulation testbed. The 
simulation is established using a professional plant simulator, 
where realistic data is constructed through its operation. The 
data is subsequently used to further our investigation into a 
support framework for distributed and interconnected systems 
[2] [3].  
Simulation is considered to be a key role in the 
advancement of critical infrastructure protection. Currently, 
there are some simulation programs, which contain smart 
built-in models for many common real systems. These 
programs can be used to test new security techniques within a 
safe environment. Specifically, simulation test beds can be 
used to analyse the inputs and outputs and do all the required 
challenging work and give realistic and comprehensive results. 
In addition, simulations are not held back by the use of real-
time data construction and can carry out complex models of 
operation in a relatively short period of time. As such,  it is 
becoming a common technique for the testing of cyber-attack 
prevention measures and for improving the level of the 
security techniques [4]. A large critical infrastructure can be 
represented by creating a simple system and allow for realistic 
testing to take place [5]. 
Within this paper, realistic data constructed from a 
simulation of 8 critical infrastructures is presented in order to 
test the CIAIRS system. Furthermore, the big data analysis 
techniques used to identify patterns of abnormal behaviour 
and share threats between infrastructures are detailed. As such, 
the remainder of the paper is divided as follows: Section 2, 
presents a background on critical infrastructures (CI), CI 
modelling and highlights the important of the simulation. 
Section 3 introduces the CIAIRS framework components and 
an overview of the system route. Subsequently, Section 4 
contains the evaluation of the system. Finally, Section 5 will 
conclude the paper. 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section, a discussion on critical infrastructure growth 
and their interdependency characteristics is put forward. The 
focus is on the interdependency between the critical 
infrastructures and a number of modelling examples are 
discussed. 
2.1 Critical Infrastructures Interdependency 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
defines critical infrastructures as any physical or virtual 
systems that would affect the national security, public 
economy and health service by their failure or if damage 
occurred to them [6]. Critical infrastructure assets, as 
explained by Command et al.,  and can be divided into three 
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categories [7]; Firstly, the physical assets, which could be 
tangible or intangible. Secondly, human assets, that can 
represent vulnerabilities by having privileged access to 
important information or systems. Thirdly, cyber assets, which 
include hardware, software, data, and which all, serve the 
network functionality. 
Infrastructure is the main source of development and 
economic construction process of any country [8]. Different 
types of urban developments depend on the size and the 
provision of infrastructure elements, which help guide the 
development of new areas. Critical infrastructures are 
considered to be the head of the development process and the 
driving force behind economic construction. Urban 
development depends on the size and the provision of 
infrastructure elements of style, which contributes to guiding 
the development of new areas. However, many infrastructures, 
such as power plants, are considerably outdated and are 
therefore difficult to repair [6]. This means that disruptions in 
service provision and weaknesses in security are apparent. 
Yusufovna et al., discuss energy resources, finance, food, 
health, government services, manufacturing, law and 
legislation, transportation [9]. As Yusufovna et al., discussed, 
there is a risk of these security weaknesses causing failures 
which can cascade across borders. For example, they present a 
survey on different groups of critical infrastructure and detail 
how many are international and national as well as local and 
individual. This means that any successful attack may have a 
political and economic impact which spams across borders.   
As previously discussed, in the result of the global 
expansion, and with the Internet revolution, infrastructures 
have become highly complex and have increased the 
interdependency at the physical and network layers. Therefore, 
the interdependency is considered to be one characteristic that 
can raise several concerns; in particular  the analysis and 
modelling of interdependencies due to the complicated 
interactions [10][11]. For that reason, accurate critical 
infrastructure modelling techniques are imperative for the 
testing of new security metrics. 
2.2 Critical Infrastructure Modelling 
Depending on the infrastructure type, the task of an 
accurate modelling is a challenge. This has led to develop 
simulation programs that can help diagnose infrastructure 
weaknesses and simulate their behaviours and interactions. 
This includes software, such as Tecnomatix [12], and the 
adaptation of existing software-based simulators such as 
OMNET++, Simulink and Matlab [13], just to name a few. 
These simulators allow for affordable representations of 
critical infrastructure systems, by modelling their behaviour, 
interactions and the integration of their specific protocol types 
such as Modbus and DNP3.  
The interest in simulation has increased as an appropriate 
and effective education process in recent years. Simulation 
has become a process to test concepts, activities, and 
experiments done through the computer. It has an increasingly  
important and prominent role in the cyber-security and critical 
infrastructure educational process [14]. Al-essa et al., defines 
simulation as  a method for teaching students that  bring 
elements from the real world, overriding difficulties such as 
material cost or human resources [15]. For that reason, the 
system proposed in this paper is evaluated through a 
simulation testbed rather than through a real-world application. 
2.3 A Cyber Framework for CI 
Simulations helped in enhancing the security level by using 
new framework concepts. For example, the NIST developed a 
framework to reduce the risk of cyber-attacks to critical 
infrastructure [16]. The NIST framework includes sets of 
procedures and methodologies that help to understand the 
cyber risks. Moreover, the approach involves flexible, 
classified, performance-based, and cost-effective method with 
more security measures. Finally, the framework helps the 
possessor and specialist of the critical infrastructure to 
recognize, classify, assess and control the cyber risk  [16].  
Specifically, the NIST cyber security framework has been set 
up to strengthen security through the following: 
 Diagnose the security status of a system. 
 Mend and form a cyber-security program.  
 Detect new chances for new or known standard. 
 Support the critical infrastructure organisation, to use the 
cyber-security framework with tools and technologies.   
Critical infrastructures have benefited from the NIST 
cyber-security framework. This has been recognised by some 
notable improvements, such as reducing the time of starting 
the security program, reduce the risk by recognize the 
improving areas in the program and improving efficient 
relationship between law and critical infrastructure [16].   
Depending on the previous different frameworks and more 
which were used in order to improve the critical infrastructure 
level of security the next section will present our framework.  
3. APPROACH FOR CIAIRS 
In our research to date, a system framework titled Critical 
Infrastructure Auto-Immune Response System (CIAIRS), 
which is able to identify threats to a network and 
communicate the potential impact, has been put forward [2]. 
The quality of the framework depends on four main features: 
Simplicity, Clarity, Boundaries, Expandability [17]. 
Therefore, these features were taken in mind while forming 
the research approach. 
CIAIRS functionality relies on identifying attacks, then the 
system assists and guides critical infrastructures on how to 
behave when abnormal behavior is detected. Furthermore, 
inspired by the human immune system characteristic the 
information is then shared to other infrastructures to create an 
immune system network [2]. In the following sub-sections, the 
CIAIRS structure is presented along with a detailed account of 
the various components, which work together to predict the 
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abnormal behaviours and share them with other 
infrastructures. Then high level of the CIARIS process is 
presented. Finally, a simulation of 8 critical infrastructures is 
presented to construct data for the evaluation of CIARIS.   
3.1    CIAIRS Design Overview 
Figure 1 indicates the CIAIRS framework design and the 
interaction between the various modules which function 
together to perform the security and communication services. 
The module linked together comprises the system as a whole 
and works together in order to detect abnormal behaviours in 
one infrastructure and share them with others. In doing so the 
aim is to prevent cyber-attacks from having a cascading 
impact and spreading to other infrastructures. Threat 
information can be communicated to allow operators in other 
infrastructures to take appropriate measures to prevent an 

















Fig. 1. CIAIRS Design 
CIAIRS is composed of several mechanisms, 
interconnected processes and a data collection modules. The 
different components that form the system, and the flow 
between the components, are displayed in Figure 1. By 
extracting the data from the network, which, for the purposes 
of this research, is provided by the simulation, the data 
manager is responsible for controlling the intake of 
information. Extracting the data in blocks prevents overload 
of the system. 
Subsequently, the data passes through a cleaning process to 
make sure there is no missing information; this stage called 
the Data Preparation stage. At this point, the data needs to 
have features extracted and be analysed. The features 
correspond to the system behaviour and present the behaviour 
in a simplified view of the overall network.  
By using the features, a data classification process is 
involved in order to indicate the normal and the abnormal 
behaviour. In order to compare the attack type, the data is sent 
to a temporary database until needed. Each block of data is 
stored as a block of column data, which would help in 
comparing the CI data collection to the CI database. 
Depending on the decision, the network uses the 
connectivity between infrastructures to share the new 
abnormal behaviour with interconnected partners. This would 
assist other infrastructure in planning for an emerging attack 
or cascading impact. At all times an administrator overviews 
the system functionality. This whole process is clarified 
further in the next subsection, which presents two key module 
components from the CIAIRS design. The Data Manager and 
the Communication Manager are explained in detail. 
3.1.1    CIAIRS Data Manager 
Figure 2 presents a Data Flow Diagram for the CIAIRS 
processing of the infrastructure data. The data manager is 
responsible for data collection, validation and checking, 
purifying and storage. Each of these methods requires time (T) 























Fig. 2. CIAIRS DFD Process  
3.1.2    CIAIRS Communication 
Figure 3 presents the communication process for sharing 
attacks information between the different partners. This is one 
of the novelties of the design. After identifying abnormal 
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behavior in one of the critical infrastructures, the attack 
information and characteristics are shared with interconnected 
partners in order to prevent cascading failures. After 
indicating an abnormal behaviour the CIAIRS communication 
process starts by checking the connectivity list in order to send 
an inherited script to the connected infrastructure. 
The script, which includes the abnormal behaviour 
information from features, ID and source are compared to the 
data source of each interconnectivity CI. By comparing the 
database source, an indicator selects the corresponding 
information cell and adds to the database. Base on the result 
an action of recommendation is distributed order to suggest 






Set field in 
current item
Actions Actions





Set field in 
current item
 
Fig. 3. CIAIRS Communication 
3. 2 CIAIRS Simulation  
In order to evaluate the discussed system design, as 
simulation testbed is constructed. Figure 4 presents an 
emulation of 8 critical infrastructures, which include key 
service providers such as an Electricity Grid and Water 
Distribution service. The full simulation is outlined in our past 
work [2][3]. Each of the critical infrastructure systems is 
given a graphical icon to represent its function more clearly. 
They can be expanded within the simulation, to show the 
different objects, which comprise the system as a whole. 
Figure 5 displays one of the presented critical 
infrastructures: The Water Distribution System. The Water 
Distributed System consists of a main water resource, the sea, 
a main electricity cable from the power plant and a transport 
system to send the water through pipes and feed both the 
houses in the compound and a factory. The Water Distribution 
System is controlled by a FlowControl to pump the water for 
both the Houses and the Factory, divided equally.  
 
Fig. 4. Simulation Overview 
 
Fig. 5. Water Distribution System  
The experiments detailed in Section 3 is used to evaluate 
the proposed system, form the process layout and constructed 
the product lifecycle management. As such, the evaluation is 
presented in the following section. 
4. EVALUATION 
This section presents the evaluation process for CIAIRS. The 
evaluation can be either formative or summative [18]. A 
formative evaluation takes place during the project itself. On 
the other hand, a summative evaluation takes place after the 
project is done in order to assess if the outcomes met the aim 
of the project [18].  Therefore, a summative evaluation is used 
to improve the service within the CI’s. The system is 
evaluated using data constructed through a simulation of a 
network of critical infrastructures. Data analysis is conducted 
using data visualisation to identify system anomalies and 
demonstrate that models of behaviour can be constructed and 
shared with other infrastructures. 
In order to reach the aim of the research, two critical 
infrastructures are chosen as a case study, the Water 
Distribution System and the Electricity Grid. The impact on 
service provision to a housing compound is illustrated. The 
trends in data patterns for both normal and abnormal 
behaviour can be identified and communicated to prevent 
future impacts.  
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The first phase is data collection that conducts with a 
sampling rate of 4 Hertz (which is every 0.25 of a second). 
Blocks of data are extracted to prevent data overload and to 
support building the features from both normal and abnormal 
datasets [3]. In the next subsection, a data sample is presented, 
data trends and a statistical production report for one of the 
CIAIRS infrastructures is also provided as an example.  
4.1 Data Sample 
In order to understand the behaviour of the system, two 
data sets are constructed from The Water Distribution 
Infrastructure System. A normal system set constructed from a 
two days simulation. Then faults were introduced to the 
system as abnormal behaviours in order to construct a dataset 
of the system under attack. For this paper, a fault is introduced 
into the water pipe 1 and the water pipe connected to the 
houses compound inside the water distributed critical 
infrastructure. Table (1) and (2) display data samples from 
normal behaviour mode and the abnormal mode in the Water 
Distribution Infrastructure, consecutively. 
Table 1. Normal Simulation Data Sample 
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Normal Data Set 
1:10:59:14.50 0 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:14.75 0 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.00 0 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.25 0 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.50 0 3 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 
Table 2. Abnormal Simulation Data Sample  
Time F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 
Abnormal Data Set 
1:10:59:14.50 3 3 1 3 50 3 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:14.75 3 3 1 3 50 3 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.00 3 3 1 3 50 3 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.25 3 3 1 3 50 3 1 3 0 2 
1:10:59:15.50 3 3 1 3 50 3 1 3 0 2 
The simulation consists of 147 components in total. The 
numbers in the tables represent the units which flow in the 
water pipe. It is clear that the between the time 1:10:59:14:50 
to 1:10:59:15:50 the level of the water was fluctuated.  
4.2 Data Trends  
Based on the data collected, a number of features were 
extracted from both normal and abnormal behaviours. 
However, for the purpose of this paper, The Water 
Distribution Infrastructure system relative standard deviation 
(RSD) was chosen to indicate the change in behavioural 
patterns between normal and abnormal, which is displayed in 
figure 6. RSD is a statistical trend that helps in indicating how 
far the data from the mean and measure the distance for every 
value from the mean in order to employ the quality assurance. 
Figure 6 displays the relative standard deviation for data trend 
for the Water Distribution Infrastructure with normal and one 
signal and two failures: water pipe 1 and the water pipe 
connected to the houses compound inside the water distributed 
critical infrastructure. 
 
Fig. 6. The normal and abnormal RSD  Water Distribution 
Figure 6 clarifies the difference between the water rate in a 
normal system and a failure system with two failures in water 
pipe 1 and the water pipe connected to the houses compound 
inside the water distributed infrastructure. The red line, with 
squares, presents the abnormal behaviour trend while the blue, 
with diamonds, presents the normal behaviour trend. It is clear 
that the data does not follow a normal distribution. Moreover, 
that the failures had a significant impact on the water pipe 
from the Water Distribution Infrastructure system to Houses 
component in the Water Distribution Infrastructure system 
more than any other component.  
4.3 Statistical Production Report 
As the previous subsection presents, the data trends 
between the normal and abnormal behaviour can be seen. It is 
this information which can be commutated using CIARIS to 
interconnected infrastructures. In this case, the faults in the 
system have affected the percentage of the production for 
some components in different CI. 
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By comparing the tables 3 and 4 which show the statistical 
service production report, it is clear that the production of the 
electricity in the houses have dropped from 71.75% to 61.19% 
and the production of the electricity in the factory also 
decreased by 10%. The result indicates that the attacks, which 
accrued in the Water Distribution Infrastructure faults, have 
affected the production of the electricity in two other 
infrastructures including a factory and the housing complex. 
Table 4. The Abnormal Production Statistical Report for The 
Water Distribution Infrastructure 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The development and evaluation of CIAIRS is presented in 
this paper. The simulation put forward can be used to create 
substantial datasets. Critical infrastructure interconnectivity is 
one of the main challenges. Systems such as CIAIRS can 
assist to countering the growing cyber-threats and the risk of 
cascading failures. This paper presented the CIAIRS’s 
framework. The various components and mechanisms were 
highlighted in order to present the role of the CIAIRS which 
shares information with other infrastructures, using the human 
immune system as a reference model, to create a distributed 
support network for enhanced cyber-security.   
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